Delegated Law Enforcement And Noncooperative Behavior
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Southern California - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number m8820.
Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 1988
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY PARK LOS ANGELES CALIFORNIA 90089-0152 U.S.A.
Phone: (213) 740-8335
Fax: (213) 740-8543
Web page: http://www.usc.edu/dept/LAS/economics/
More information through EDIRC
law ; economic behaviour ; social behaviour ; social welfare;
Other versions of this item:
- Besanko, David & Spulber, Daniel F, 1989. "Delegated Law Enforcement and Noncooperative Behavior," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 25-52, Spring.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Jost, Peter-J, 2001. "Crime, coordination, and punishment: An economic analysis," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 23-46, March.
- M. Martin Boyer, 2001. "Resistance is Futile: An Essay in Crime and Commitment," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-58, CIRANO.
- Gianmaria Martini & Cinzia Rovesti, 2004.
"Antitrust policy and price collusion. Public agencies vs delegation,"
Recherches économiques de Louvain,
De Boeck Université, vol. 70(2), pages 127-151.
- Gianmaria MARTINI & Cinzia ROVESTI, 2004. "Antitrust policy and price collusion : public agencies vs delegation," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2004021, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Debra J. Aron & Paul Olivella, 1991.
"Bonuses and Penalties as Equilibrium Incentive Devices, with Application to Manufacturing Systems,"
932, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Olivella, P. & Aron, D.J., 1991. "Bonuses and Penalties as Equilibrium Incentive Devices, with Application to Manufacturing Systems," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 153.91, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Jost, Peter-J., 1997. "Regulatory enforcement in the presence of a court system," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 491-508, December.
- Rouillon, Sébastien, 2010. "Optimal law enforcement with costly public funds," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 345-348, December.
- Coşgel, Metin M. & Etkes, Haggay & Miceli, Thomas J., 2011.
"Private law enforcement, fine sharing, and tax collection: Theory and historical evidence,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 546-552.
- Metin M. Cosgel & Haggay Etkes & Thomas J. Miceli, 2010. "Private Law Enforcement, Fine Sharing, and Tax Collection: Theory and Historical Evidence," Working papers 2010-03, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.