Private Law Enforcement, Fine Sharing, and Tax Collection: Theory and Historical Evidence
AbstractThis paper contributes to the literature on private law enforcement by proposing a novel solution to the problem of underenforcement by monopolistic enforcers. Monopolistic enforcers underinvest in fine collection because, by maximizing net expected revenue, they ignore the social benefits of deterrence. We show that this problem can be partially resolved by combining the tasks of law enforcement with tax collection because a joint enforcer-collector will have an interest in reducing the crime rate in order to maximize his income from taxes. In support of the theory, we discuss two historical examples of this practice: decentralized law enforcement under European feudalism, and centralized law enforcement in the Ottoman Empire.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Connecticut, Department of Economics in its series Working papers with number 2010-03.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2010
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
Criminal fines; deterrence; private law enforcement; tax collection;
Other versions of this item:
- Coşgel, Metin M. & Etkes, Haggay & Miceli, Thomas J., 2011. "Private law enforcement, fine sharing, and tax collection: Theory and historical evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 546-552.
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2010-02-13 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2010-02-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-HIS-2010-02-13 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-LAW-2010-02-13 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-REG-2010-02-13 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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