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Delegated Law Enforcement and Noncooperative Behavior

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Author Info
Besanko, David
Spulber, Daniel F

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.

Volume (Year): 5 (1989)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
Pages: 25-52
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Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:5:y:1989:i:1:p:25-52

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Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
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  1. M. Martin Boyer, 2001. "Resistance is Futile: An Essay in Crime and Commitment," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-58, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  2. Debra J. Aron & Paul Olivella, 1991. "Bonuses and Penalties as Equilibrium Incentive Devices, with Application to Manufacturing Systems," Discussion Papers 932, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Pau Olivella, 1995. "Information Structures and the Delegation of Monitoring," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 39, pages 01, Juillet-S. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Thierry Penard & Saïd Souam, 2002. "Collusion et politique de la concurrence en information asymétrique," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 66, pages 09, Avril-Jui. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Gianmaria Martini & Cinzia Rovesti, 2004. "Antitrust policy and price collusion. Public agencies vs delegation," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 70(2), pages 127-151. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-19.

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