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The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts

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  • Sylvain Bourjade
  • Bruno Jullien

Abstract

We analyze situations in which an expert is biased toward some decision but cares also about his reputation in the market for experts. The information the expert reveals decreases as his bias moves toward stronger preference for the status quo. We show that it is optimal to publicly disclose both the expert's contribution and his identity. Surprisingly, revealing the intensity of the expert's bias doesn't always improve the information he reveals in equilibrium. The presence of a second expert raises the first expert's incentives to report truthfully when reports are public, but reduces them when they are secret. In particular, having an option to call another expert may be detrimental in terms of information production if reports are not public. Finally, sequential consultation of experts reduces the information obtained when reports are public, but raises it when they are secret.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 42 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (09)
Pages: 575-594

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Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:42:y:2011:i:3:p:575-594

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Cited by:
  1. Midjord, Rune, 2012. "Competitive Pressure and Job Interview Lying: A Game Theoretical Analysis," DFAEII Working Papers 2012-14, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
  2. Alessandro Ispano, 2013. "Information Acquisition and the Value of bad News," Working Papers, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique 2013-36, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.

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