The Politics of Persuasion when Voters are Rational
AbstractA democratic society is considered where the voters, but not the politicians, are uncertain about how the economy works. The parties therefore have a strategic motive to misinform the voters. Will the voters learn how the economy works and will the policy decisions be efficient? It turns out that the degree of polarization of the political parties is crucial. If the parties are very polarized, voters will not trust the parties and the policy will not reflect how the economy actually works.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 93-15.
Length: 19 pages
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Publication status: Published in: Journal of Economics, 1995, 97(3) pp 357-368
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economic models of political processes; social choice studies; voting;
Other versions of this item:
- Schultz, Christian, 1995. " The Politics of Persuasion When Voters Are Rational," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(3), pages 357-68, September.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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- Heidhues, Paul & Lagerlof, Johan, 2003.
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Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier,
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- Schultz, Christian, 2002. "Policy biases with voters' uncertainty about the economy and the government," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 487-506, March.
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- Tilman Klumpp, 2011. "Populism, Partisanship, and the Funding of Political Campaigns," Emory Economics, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta) 1107, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).
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