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The Politics of Persuasion when Voters are Rational

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Author Info

  • : Christian Schultz

    (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

Abstract

A democratic society is considered where the voters, but not the politicians, are uncertain about how the economy works. The parties therefore have a strategic motive to misinform the voters. Will the voters learn how the economy works and will the policy decisions be efficient? It turns out that the degree of polarization of the political parties is crucial. If the parties are very polarized, voters will not trust the parties and the policy will not reflect how the economy actually works.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 93-15.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation:
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Publication status: Published in: Journal of Economics, 1995, 97(3) pp 357-368
Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9315

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Keywords: economic models of political processes; social choice studies; voting;

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Cited by:
  1. Heidhues, Paul & Lagerlof, Johan, 2003. "Hiding information in electoral competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 48-74, January.
  2. Allcott, Hunt & Lederman, Daniel & Lopez, Ramon, 2006. "Political institutions, inequality, and agricultural growth : the public expenditure connection," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3902, The World Bank.
  3. Voß, Achim & Lingens, Jörg, 2014. "What's the damage? Environmental regulation with policy-motivated bureaucrats," CAWM Discussion Papers, Center of Applied Economic Research Münster (CAWM), University of Münster 67, Center of Applied Economic Research Münster (CAWM), University of Münster.
  4. Schultz, Christian, 2002. "Policy biases with voters' uncertainty about the economy and the government," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 487-506, March.
  5. Mike Felgenhauer, 2012. "Revealing information in electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 55-68, October.
  6. Tilman Klumpp, 2011. "Populism, Partisanship, and the Funding of Political Campaigns," Emory Economics, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta) 1107, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).

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