1. Edward L. Glaeser & Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2004. "Strategic Extremism: Why Republicans and Democrats Divide on Religious Values," NBER Working Papers 10835, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Atkinson, Scott E & Sandler, Todd & Tschirhart, John, 1987. "Terrorism in a Bargaining Framework," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 1-21, April.
3. Asoka Bandarage, 2004. "Beyond Globalization and Ethno-religious Fundamentalism," Development, Palgrave Macmillan Journals, vol. 47(1), pages 35-41, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Bruno S. Frey & Simon Luechinger, . "How to Fight Terrorism: Alternatives to Deterrence," IEW - Working Papers iewwp137, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
5. B. Douglas Bernheim, 1984. "Strategic Deterrence of Sequential Entry into an Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 1-11, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Edward L. Glaeser & Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2004. "Strategic Extremism: Why Republicans and Democrats Divide on Religious Values," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2044, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
7. DIRK RÚBBELKE, 2005. "Differing motivations for terrorism," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 16(1), pages 19-27, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Esteban, Joan & Ray, Debraj, 1999. "Conflict and Distribution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 379-415, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Claude Berrebi & Esteban Klor, 2004. "On Terrorism and Electoral Outcomes: Theory and Evidence from the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," Working Papers 859, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Claude Berrebi & Esteban F. Klor, 2004. "On Terrorism and Electoral Outcomes: Theory and Evidence from the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," Working Papers 4, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
10. Glazer, A., 1998. "Strategic Positioning and Campaining," Papers 97-98-23, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
11. Lapan, Harvey E. & Sandler, Todd, 1993. "Terrorism and signalling," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 383-397, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Lapan, Harvey E. & Sandler, Todd, 2003. "Terrorism and Signalling," Staff General Research Papers 10808, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
12. Sandler, Todd & Enders, Walter, 2004. "An economic perspective on transnational terrorism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 301-316, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Laussel, Didier, 2002. "Delegation effects in representative democracies: do they foster extremism?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 191-205, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Waldman, Michael, 1987. "Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(2), pages 301-10, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Michael Waldman, 1985. "Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem," UCLA Economics Working Papers 364, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
15. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1971. "Increasing risk II: Its economic consequences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 66-84, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Appelbaum, Elie & Weber, Shlomo, 1992. "A note on the free rider problem in oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 473-480, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Blomberg, S. Brock & Hess, Gregory D. & Weerapana, Akila, 2004. "Economic conditions and terrorism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 463-478, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Glazer, Amihai & Gradstein, Mark & Konrad, Kai A, 1998. "The Electoral Politics of Extreme Policies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(451), pages 1677-85, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Glazer, A. & Konrad, K.A., 1995. "The Electoral Politics of Extreme Policies," Papers 94-95-23, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
19. Appelbaum, Elie, 2008. "Extremism as a strategic tool in conflicts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 352-364, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Westermark, Andreas, 1999. "Extremism, Campaigning and Ambiguity," Working Paper Series 1999:9, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Westermark, A., 1999. "Extremism, Campaigning and Ambiguity," Papers 1999:9, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
    • Westermark, Andreas, 2004. "Extremism, campaigning and ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 421-452, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. Mario Ferrero, 2005. "Radicalization as a reaction to failure: An economic model of Islamic extremism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(1), pages 199-220, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Ferrero, Mario, 2002. "Radicalization as a reaction to failure: an economic model of islamic extremism," P.O.L.I.S. department's Working Papers 31, Department of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS. [Downloadable!]
22. Muhammad Islam & Wassim Shahin, 2001. "Applying economic methodology to the war on terrorism," Forum for Social Economics, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 7-26, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
23. Gilbert, Richard & Vives, Xavier, 1986. "Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(1), pages 71-83, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. Dalibor Roháč, 2009. "Why did the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapse? A public choice perspective," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 160-176, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Elie Appelbaum, 2008. "Extremism: Root Causes and Strategic Use in Conflicts," Working Papers 2008_02, York University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]