Radicalization as a reaction to failure: an economic model of islamic extremism
AbstractThis paper views Islamist radicals as self-interested political revolutionaries and builds on a general model of political extremism developed in a previous paper (Ferrero, 2002), where extremism is modelled as a production factor whose effect on expected revenue is initially positive and then turns negative, and whose level is optimally chosen by a revolutionary or-ganization. The organization is bound by a free-access constraint and hence uses the degree of extremism as a means of indirectly controlling its level of membership with the aim of maximizing expected per capita income of its members, like a producer co-operative. The gist of the argument is that radicalization may be an optimal reaction to perceived failure (a widespread perception in the Muslim world) when political activists are, at the margin, relatively strongly averse to effort but not so averse to extremism, a configuration that is at odds with secular, Western-style revolutionary politics but seems to capture well the essence of Islamic revolutionary politics, embedded as it is in a doctrinal framework.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS in its series POLIS Working Papers with number 31.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2002
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Other versions of this item:
- Mario Ferrero, 2005. "Radicalization as a reaction to failure: An economic model of Islamic extremism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(1), pages 199-220, January.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
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- Iannaccone, Laurence R, 1992. "Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(2), pages 271-91, April.
- Laurence R. Iannaccone, 1997. "Toward an Economic Theory of "Fundamentalism"," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 153(1), pages 100-, March.
- Ferrero, Mario, 1999. "A model of political enterprise," POLIS Working Papers 9, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
- Grossman, Herschel I, 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 912-21, September.
- Grossman, Herschel I, 1999. "Kleptocracy and Revolutions," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(2), pages 267-83, April.
- Mario Ferrero, 2004. "Revolution or Reform? Socialism’s Dilemma as Rational Choice Problem," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 21, pages 251-282.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading lists or Wikipedia pages:
- Radicalisation in Wikipedia (French)
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