Radicalization as a reaction to failure: an economic model of islamic extremism
Abstract
This paper views Islamist radicals as self-interested political revolutionaries and builds on a general model of political extremism developed in a previous paper (Ferrero, 2002), where extremism is modelled as a production factor whose effect on expected revenue is initially positive and then turns negative, and whose level is optimally chosen by a revolutionary or-ganization. The organization is bound by a free-access constraint and hence uses the degree of extremism as a means of indirectly controlling its level of membership with the aim of maximizing expected per capita income of its members, like a producer co-operative. The gist of the argument is that radicalization may be an optimal reaction to perceived failure (a widespread perception in the Muslim world) when political activists are, at the margin, relatively strongly averse to effort but not so averse to extremism, a configuration that is at odds with secular, Western-style revolutionary politics but seems to capture well the essence of Islamic revolutionary politics, embedded as it is in a doctrinal framework.Download Info
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Paper provided by Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS in its series POLIS Working Papers with number 31.Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uca:ucapdv:31
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Web page: http://polis.unipmn.it
Related research
Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Mario Ferrero, 2005. "Radicalization as a reaction to failure: An economic model of Islamic extremism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(1), pages 199-220, January.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-02-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAM-2003-02-03 (Central & South America)
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Grossman, Herschel I, 1999. "Kleptocracy and Revolutions," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(2), pages 267-83, April.
- Mario Ferrero, 2004. "Revolution or Reform? Socialism’s Dilemma as Rational Choice Problem," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 21, pages 251-282.
- Laurence R. Iannaccone, 1997. "Toward an Economic Theory of "Fundamentalism"," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 153(1), pages 100-, March.
- Iannaccone, Laurence R, 1992. "Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(2), pages 271-91, April.
- Ferrero, Mario, 1999. "A model of political enterprise," POLIS Working Papers 9, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
- Grossman, Herschel I, 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 912-21, September.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Stefania Ottone & Ferrucio Ponzano & Roberto Ricciuti, 2009.
"Simulating Voting Rule Reforms for the Italian Parliament: An Economic Perspective,"
Czech Economic Review,
Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 3(3), pages 292-304, October.
- Ottone, Stefania & Ponzano, Ferruccio & Ricciuti, Roberto, 2007. "Simulating voting rule reforms for the Italian parliament. An economic perspective," POLIS Working Papers 88, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
- Ferrero, Mario, 2008. "The triumph of Christianity in the Roman empire: An economic interpretation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 73-87, March.
- Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 2007.
"Political extremism in the presence of a free rider problem,"
Public Choice,
Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 31-40, October.
- Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 2005. "Political extremism in the presence of a free rider problem," Working Papers 2005_3, York University, Department of Economics.
- Elie Appelbaum, 2008. "Extremism: Root Causes and Strategic Use in Conflicts," Working Papers 2008_02, York University, Department of Economics.
- Panu Poutvaara & Andreas Wagener, 2010. "The invisible hand plays dice: multiple equilibria in sects markets," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(3), pages 483-502, December.
- Addison, T. & Murshed, S.M., 2002. "Transnational terrorism as a spillover of domestic disputes in other countries," ISS Working Papers - General Series 1765019130, International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University (ISS), The Hague.
- Elie Appelbaum, 2006. "Strategic extremism," Working Papers 2006_12, York University, Department of Economics.
- Addison, Tony & Murshed, S. Mansoob, 2002. "Transnational Terrorism as a Spillover of Domestic Disputes in Other Countries," Working Papers UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
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