The Theory of Voting and Equilibria in Noncooperative Games
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 5 (1993)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
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- Paolo Balduzzi, 2005. "Optimal use of scarce information: When partisan voters are socially useful," Working Papers 87, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2005.
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- Daniel Cardona-Coll, 2000. "Multi-Issue Bargaining Under Budget-Constraints," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-22, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
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