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Hyper-Stable Social Welfare Functions

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Author Info

  • Jean Lainé

    (Department of Economics, Bilgi University - Istanbul Bilgi University)

  • Ali Ihsan Ozkes

    (Department of Economics, Bilgi University - Istanbul Bilgi University, Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)

  • Remzi Sanver

    (Department of Economics, Bilgi University - Istanbul Bilgi University)

Abstract

We introduce a new consistency condition for neutral social welfare functions, called hyperstability. A social welfare function a selects a complete weak order from a profile PN of linear orders over any finite set of alternatives, given N individuals. Each linear order P in PN generates a linear order over orders of alternatives,called hyper-preference, by means of a preference extension. Hence each profile PN generates a hyper-profile ˙PN. We assume that all preference extensions are separable: the hyper-preference of some order P ranks order Q above order Q0 if the set of alternative pairs P and Q agree on contains the one P and Q0 agree on. A special sub-class of separable extensions contains all Kemeny extensions, which build hyper-preferences by using the Kemeny distance criterion. A social welfare function a is hyper-stable (resp. Kemeny-stable) if at any profile PN, at least one linearization of a(PN) is ranked first by a( ˙PN), where ˙PN is any separable (resp. Kemeny) hyper-profile induced from PN. We show that no scoring rule is hyper-stable, and that no unanimous scoring rule is Kemeny-stable, while there exists a hyper-stable Condorcet social welfare function.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00871312.

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Date of creation: 09 Oct 2013
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00871312

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Related research

Keywords: Hyperpreferences - Kemeny distance - Social Welfare Functions - Stability;

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