Strategy-proof Preference Aggregation
AbstractAn aggregation rule maps each profile of individual strict preference orderings over a set of alternatives into a social ordering over that set. We call such a rule strategyproof if misreporting one’s preference never produces a social ordering that is strictly between the original ordering and one’s own preference. After describing a few examples of manipulable rules, we study in some detail three classes of strategy-proof rules: (i) rules based on a monotonic alteration of the majority relation generated by the preference profile; (ii) rules improving upon a fixed status-quo; and (iii) rules generalizing the Condorcet-Kemeny aggregation method.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 12-2012.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 2012
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- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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Cahiers de recherche
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