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On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogenous Union

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Author Info
Salvador BARBER?Author-Email: salvador.barbera@uab.es
Matthew O. JACKSON

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Abstract

Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who then participate in later votes at the union level on their behalf. The countries, provinces, and states may vary in their populations and composition. If we wish to maximize the total expected utility of all agents in the union, how to weight the votes of the representatives of the different countries, states or districts at the union level? We provide a simple characterization of the efficient voting rule in terms of the weights assigned to different districts and the voting threshold (how large a qualified majority is needed to induce change versus the status quo). Next, in the context of a model of the correlation structure of agents preferences, we analyze how voting weights relate to the population size of a country. We then analyze the voting weights in Council of the European Union under the Nice Treaty and the recently proposed constitution, and contrast them under different versions of our model.

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Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 597.03.

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Length: 29
Date of creation: 11 Aug 2003
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Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:597.03

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Annick Laruelle & Mika Widgrén, 1998. "Is the allocation of voting power among EU states fair?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 317-339, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Leech, Dennis, 2002. " Designing the Voting System for the Council of the European Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(3-4), pages 437-64, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 2002. "Choosing How to Choose: Self Stable Majority Rules," Microeconomics 0211003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Paul Schure & Francesco Passerelli & David Scoones, 2007. "When the Powerful Drag Their Feet," Department Discussion Papers 0703, Department of Economics, University of Victoria. [Downloadable!]
  2. Bard Hastad, 2007. "Strategic Delegation and Voting Rules," Discussion Papers 1442, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  3. Hans Pitlik & Friedrich Schneider & Harald Strotmann, 2005. "Legislative Malapportionment and the Politicization of Germany's Intergovernmental Transfer System," IAW Discussion Papers 19, Institut für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung (IAW). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Helge Berger & Till Mueller, 2007. "How should large and small countries be represented in a currency union?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 471-484, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Olfa Alouini, 2009. "Country size, economic performance and the political economy of the euro zone : an empirical study of the size divide," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2007-01, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE). [Downloadable!]
  6. Serguei Kaniovski, 2008. "The exact bias of the Banzhaf measure of power when votes are neither equiprobable nor independent," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 281-300, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Tröger, Thomas, 2006. "Garbled Elections," CEPR Discussion Papers 5958, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Patrick W. Schmitz & Thomas Tröger, 2006. "Garbled Elections," Discussion Papers 195, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  8. Federico Valenciano & Annick Laruelle, 2005. "Bargaining In Committees Of Representatives: The Optimal Voting Rule," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-24, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  9. Jose Apesteguia & Miguel A. Ballester & Rosa Ferrer, 2006. "On the Justice of Voting Systems," Economics Working Papers 987, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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