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Consistent Representative Democracy

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Author Info
Chambers, Christopher P.

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Abstract

We study axioms which define "representative democracy" in an environment in which agents vote over a finite set of alternatives. We focus on a property that states that whether votes are aggregated directly or indirectly make no difference. We call this property 'representative consistency'. 'Representative consistency' formalizes the idea that a voting rule should be immune to gerrymandering. We characterize the class of rules satisfying 'unanimity, anonymity,' and 'representative consistency'. We call these rules "partial priority rules." A partial priority rule can be interpreted as a rule in which each agent can "veto" certain alternatives. We investigate the implications of imposing other axioms to the list specified above. We also study the partial priority rules in the context of specific economic models.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences in its series Working Papers with number 1217.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2005
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Publication status: Published:
Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:1217

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Postal: Working Paper Assistant, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125
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Related research
Keywords: social choice; representative systems; majority rule; gerrymandering;

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Fishburn, Peter C, 1971. "The Theory of Representative Majority Decision," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 39(2), pages 273-84, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Duggan, John & Martinelli, Cesar, 2001. "A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 259-294, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996. "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts," Discussion Papers 1170, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  4. Fine, Kit, 1972. "Some Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Representative Decision on Two Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(6), pages 1083-90, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Diewert, W.E., 1992. "Symmetric Means and Choice Under Uncertainty," UBC Departmental Archives 92-32, UBC Department of Economics.
  6. Blackorby, Charles & Donaldson, David, 1984. "Social criteria for evaluating population change," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 13-33, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Ching, S. & Thomson, W., 1993. "Population-Monotonic Solutions in Public Good Economies with Single- Peaked Preferences," RCER Working Papers 362, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  8. Thomson, William, 1993. "The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 31-36. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Plott, Charles R, 1973. "Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1075-91, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Chambers, Christoper P., 2005. "An axiomatic theory of political representation," Working Papers 1218, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Sebastian Bervoets & Vincent Merlin, 2006. "Stability and Manipulation in Representative Democracies," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 669.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
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