Stability and Segregation in Group Formation
AbstractThis paper presents a model of group formation based on the assumption that individuals prefer to associate with people similar to them. It is shown that, in general, if the number of groups that can be formed is bounded, then a stable partition of the society into groups may not exist. A partition is defined as stable if none of the individuals would prefer be in a different group than the one he is in. However, if individuals’ characteristics are one-dimensional, then a stable partition always exists. We give sufficient conditions for stable partitions to be segregating (in the sense that, for example, low-characteristic individuals are in one group and high-characteristic ones are in another) and Pareto efficient. In addition, we propose a dynamic model of individual myopic behavior describing the evolution of group formation to an eventual stable, segregating, and Pareto efficient partition.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem in its series Discussion Paper Series with number dp263.
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2000
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2002, vol. 38, pp. 318-346.
group formation; coalition structure; local public goods; segregation; myopic optimization; weak acyclicity;
Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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