Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets
AbstractWe consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. In these so-called roommate markets agents are consumers and resources at the same time. We investigate two new properties that capture the effect newcomers have on incumbent agents. Competition sensitivity focuses on newcomers as additional consumers and requires that some incumbents will suffer if competition is caused by newcomers. Resource sensitivity focuses on newcomers as additional resources and requires that this is beneficial for some incumbents. For solvable roommate markets, we provide the first characterizations of the core using either competition or resource sensitivity. On the domain of all roommate markets, we obtain two associated impossibility results.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 72 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Core Matching Competition sensitivity Resource sensitivity Roommate market;
Other versions of this item:
- Klaus, Bettina, 2007. "Competition and Resource Sensitivity in Marriage and Roommate Markets," Research Memoranda 046, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
- Bettina Klaus, 2007. "Competition and Resource Sensitivity in Marriage and Roommate Markets," Harvard Business School Working Papers 09-072, Harvard Business School, revised Dec 2008.
- Bettina Klaus, 2010. "Competition and Resource Sensitivity in Marriage and Roommate Markets," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du DÃ©partement d'EconomÃ©trie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 10.03, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
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