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Converging to efficiency : the Ramón y Cajal Program experience

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  • Alonso-Borrego, César
  • Romero-Medina, Antonio
  • Triossi, Matteo

Abstract

We analyze the evolution on the design of a policy measure promoted by the Spanish Government: the Ramón y Cajal Program. In the first calls of the Program, an eligibility requirement for a researcher was a preacceptance from at least one Spanish research institution. This requirement was removed in the fourth call. We model the recruiting process as a twosided matching model to find the reason for the new design. We model the situation as if research centers decided by majority to play either the old or the new mechanism. Our results prove that in a repeated game and assuming that research personnel is scarce, even endogamic centers will prefer the new mechanism after a finite number of calls. We also analyze application data for the first five calls, finding empirical support to our assumptions and theoretical findings.

Suggested Citation

  • Alonso-Borrego, César & Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2007. "Converging to efficiency : the Ramón y Cajal Program experience," UC3M Working papers. Economics we075328, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    • Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we075328
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Pedro Marques & Kevin Morgan, 2021. "Innovation without Regional Development? The Complex Interplay of Innovation, Institutions, and Development," Economic Geography, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 97(5), pages 475-496, October.

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    JEL classification:

    • C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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