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Ramón y Cajal: Mediation and Meritocracy

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  • Matteo Triossi
  • Antonio Romero-Medina

Abstract

The Ramón y Cajal Program promotes the hiring of top researchers in Spanish R&D centers and academic institutions. The centralized mechanism associated to the Program is analyzed. The paper models it as a two-sided matching market and studies if it provides the incentives to increase the quality of the researchers hired. We analyze the mechanism both under complete and incomplete information. The comparison of the theoretical findings with the available data points out that the mechanism provides poor incentives and does not prevent collusion between research departments and candidates in the hiring process.

Suggested Citation

  • Matteo Triossi & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2006. "Ramón y Cajal: Mediation and Meritocracy," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 22, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    • Handle: RePEc:cca:wpaper:22
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Pedro Marques & Kevin Morgan, 2021. "Innovation without Regional Development? The Complex Interplay of Innovation, Institutions, and Development," Economic Geography, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 97(5), pages 475-496, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Matching Markets; Preagreements; Implementation.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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