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Efficient Priority Rules

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Author Info
Lars Ehlers
Bettina Klaus ()

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Abstract

We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and renegotiation-proofness. Such a rule respects an acyclical priority structure and the allocations can be determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 554.02.

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Length: 14
Date of creation: 09 Dec 2002
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Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:554.02

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Related research
Keywords: acyclical priority structures; indivisible objects;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ehlers, Lars, 2002. "Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 298-317, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Szilvia Papai, 2000. "Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(6), pages 1403-1434, November.
  3. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve, 2001. "A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 295-328, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 1999. "Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 557-567. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Haluk I. Ergin, 2002. "Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2489-2497, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina, 2005. "Consistent House Allocation," Cahiers de recherche 2005-08, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Balinski, Michel & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 73-94, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Ergin, Haluk I., 2000. "Consistency in house allocation problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 77-97, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina & Papai, Szilvia, 2002. "Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 329-339, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 233-260, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ehlers,Lars & Klaus,Bettina, 2005. "Consistent House Allocation," Research Memoranda 007, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2004. "Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 616.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 01 Mar 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Haluk Ergin & Tayfun Sönmez, 2005. "Games of School Choice under the Boston Mechanism," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 619, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina, 2003. "Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems," Cahiers de recherche 12-2003, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Guillaume Haeringer & Flip Klijn, 2006. "Constrained School Choice," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 671.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 02 Dec 2008. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Alvin Roth, 2008. "Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 537-569, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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