AbstractWe study strategy-proof decision rules in the variants of the canonical public good model proposed by Borgers and Postl (2009). In this setup, we fully characterize the set of budget-balanced strategy-proof deterministic mechanisms, which are simple threshold rules. For smooth probabilistic mechanisms we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for dominant strategy implementation. When allowing for discontinuities in the mechanism, our necessary condition remains valid, but additional conditions must hold for sufficiency. We also show that, among ex posts efficient rules, only dictatorial ones are strategy-proof. While familiar in spirit, this result is not the consequence of any known result in the literature.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Birmingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 10-12r.
Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2011
Date of revision:
Compromise; Dominant strategy implementation;
Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-06-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-06-25 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2011-06-25 (Game Theory)
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