Strategy-proof Cardinal Decision Schemes
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 28 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Peter, Hans & Sen, Arunava, 2005. "Strategy-proof Cardinal Decision Schemes," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 722, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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