Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Expected Utility Maximizers

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Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Expected Utility Maximizers

Author Info

Barbera, S
Bogomolnaia, A
van der Stel, H

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Salvador Barberà

Abstract

We consider social choice rules which select a lottery over outcomes for each progile of individual preferences. Agents are assumed to have preferences over lotteries satisfying the axioms of expected utility. We exhibit a large class of rules satisfying strategy- proofness.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 330.96.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 1996
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Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:330.96

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Article
- Barbera, Salvador & Bogomolnaia, Anna & van der Stel, Hans, 1998. "Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 89-103, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation

Cited by:
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Bhaskar Dutta & Hans Peters & Arunava Sen, 2007. "Strategy-proof Cardinal Decision Schemes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 163-179, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Peter, Hans & Sen, Arunava, 2005. "Strategy-proof Cardinal Decision Schemes," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 722, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Bhaskar Dutta & Hans Peters & Arunava Sen, 2008. "Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 701-702, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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This page was last updated on 2008-7-24.

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