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Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes

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  • Gibbard, Allan
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    Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

    Volume (Year): 46 (1978)
    Issue (Month): 3 (May)
    Pages: 595-614

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    Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:46:y:1978:i:3:p:595-614

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    Cited by:
    1. repec:ksb:journl:v:2:y:2009:i:1:p:42-66 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1999. "Strategy-proofness and Markets," Discussion Papers 1255, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Islam, Jamal & Mohajan, Haradhan & Moolio, Pahlaj, 2009. "Political Economy and Social Welfare with Voting Procedure," MPRA Paper 50671, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 25 Sep 2009.
    4. HOUGAARD, Jens L. & moreno-ternero, JUAN D. & OSTERDAL, Lars P., 2013. "Assigning agents to a line," CORE Discussion Papers 2013015, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    5. Ehlers, Lars & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2002. "Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 408-434, August.
    6. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve & Stong, Richard, 2005. "Collective choice under dichotomous preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 165-184, June.
    7. Roger B. Myerson, 1996. "Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory," Discussion Papers 1162, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    8. Olivier Bochet & Ton Storcken, 2008. "Maximal Domains for Strategy-proof or Maskin Monotonic Choice Rules," Diskussionsschriften dp0901, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    9. Chambers, Christopher P., 2004. "Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(8), pages 953-962, December.
    10. Bhaskar Dutta & Hans Peters & Arunava Sen, 2008. "Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 701-702, May.
    11. Shasikanta Nandeibam, 2013. "The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 205-238, September.
    12. Dutta, Bhaskar & Peters, Hans & Sen, Arunava, 2002. "Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 392-416, October.
    13. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve, 2001. "A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 295-328, October.
    14. Barbera, S & Bogomolnaia, A & van der Stel, H, 1996. "Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Expected Utility Maximizers," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 330.96, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    15. repec:dgr:umamet:2006002 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Roger B. Myerson, 1991. "Proportional Representation," Discussion Papers 928, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    17. repec:dgr:umamet:2005009 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Wolitzky, Alexander, 2009. "Fully sincere voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 720-735, November.

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