Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge
AbstractThe theory of contracts is one of the most active research areas in economics. While classic contract theory failed to account for institutions such as property rights and authority, the theory of incomplete contracts has overcome these conceptual problems and produced a variety of interesting applications. This paper studies some of these applications. We discuss the management of research and developement activities, privatization, and the division of labor within the government. While the foundations of the theory of incomplete contracts are still a matter of dispute, the applications proved to be very successful and provided many new and exciting insights.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 6943.
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftswissenschaften 1.48(1997): pp. 57-69
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
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