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Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge

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  • Ewerhart, Christian
  • Schmitz, Patrick W.

Abstract

The theory of contracts is one of the most active research areas in economics. While classic contract theory failed to account for institutions such as property rights and authority, the theory of incomplete contracts has overcome these conceptual problems and produced a variety of interesting applications. This paper studies some of these applications. We discuss the management of research and developement activities, privatization, and the division of labor within the government. While the foundations of the theory of incomplete contracts are still a matter of dispute, the applications proved to be very successful and provided many new and exciting insights.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 6943.

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Date of creation: 1997
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Publication status: Published in Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftswissenschaften 1.48(1997): pp. 57-69
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:6943

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  1. Tirole, Jean, 1994. "The Internal Organization of Government," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January.
  2. Seabright, Paul, 1994. "Accountability and Decentralization in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 889, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Schmidt, Klaus M., 1996. "The costs and benefits of privatization: An incomplete contracts approach," Munich Reprints in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics 19773, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  4. Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "A theory of debt and equity: diversity of securities and manager-shareholder congruence," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9593, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  5. Schmidt, Klaus M, 1996. "The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 1-24, April.
  6. Burkart, Mike & Gromb, Denis & Panunzi, Fausto, 1997. "Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 112(3), pages 693-728, August.
  7. Oliver D. Hart, 1987. "Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 448, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  8. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1996. "Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 1-25, February.
  9. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1996. "Die theoretische Fundierung unvollständiger Verträge," MPRA Paper 6947, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Opening the black box of innovation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 701-710, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Schmitz, Patrick W, 1998. " Randomization in Coalition Contracts," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 341-53, March.
  2. Patrick W. Schmitz & Dirk Sliwka, 1998. "Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 15, pages 233-243.
  3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 1998. "On Randomization in Coalition Contracts," MPRA Paper 13446, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Kumkar, Lars, 1998. "Privatwirtschaftliche Koordinierungsstrukturen in vertikal strukturierten Industrien: Eine Analyse der Stromwirtschaft auf Grundlage der neuen Institutionenökonomik," Kiel Working Papers 873, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

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