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Universal possibility and impossibility results

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  • Schweizer, Urs
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

    Volume (Year): 57 (2006)
    Issue (Month): 1 (October)
    Pages: 73-85

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:57:y:2006:i:1:p:73-85

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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    1. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
    2. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1979. "Incentives and incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 25-45, February.
    3. Cramton, Peter & Gibbons, Robert & Klemperer, Paul, 1987. "Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 615-32, May.
    4. Steven R. Williams, 1999. "A characterization of efficient, bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 155-180.
    5. Makowski Louis & Mezzetti Claudio, 1993. "The Possibility of Efficient Mechanisms for Trading an Indivisible Object," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 451-465, April.
    6. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 169-188, January.
    7. Makowski Louis & Mezzetti Claudio, 1994. "Bayesian and Weakly Robust First Best Mechanisms: Characterizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 500-519, December.
    8. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 12530, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Werner Güth & Martin Hellwig, 1986. "The private supply of a public good," Journal of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 121-159, December.
    10. Georgia Kosmopoulou, 1999. "Payoff equivalence between Bayesian and ex post individually rational dominant strategy mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 229-237.
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    Cited by:
    1. Grüner, Hans Peter & Koriyama, Yukio, 2012. "Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 152-167.
    2. Nicolas Figueroa & Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "What to put in the table," Documentos de Trabajo, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile 237, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    3. Figueroa, Nicolás & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2012. "Asymmetric partnerships," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 268-271.
    4. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," MPRA Paper 23157, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 7584, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Segal, Ilya R. & Whinston, Michael D., 2011. "A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining)," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 6(1), January.

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