Emergence of Rating Agencies: Implications for Establishing a Regional Rating Agency in Asia
AbstractThe present analysis sheds light on the setting up a regional rating agency in Asia in the wake of recent financial crisis. We investigate the policy facing a financial regulator while evaluating whether or not to admit new entrants into the credit rating market. In an incomplete contracting framework, we show that an impartial financial regulatory body (represented by a benevolent supranational organization) can facilitate credit ratings of high quality by allowing for the entry of new rating agencies on a non-single basis than it does for a mere single entry. This finding is caused by increased competition among the rating agencies, which induces higher quality of rating services even should rating agencies still exert below their maximum level of efforts.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by eSocialSciences in its series Working Papers with number id:2927.
Date of creation: Sep 2010
Date of revision:
Note: Institutional Papers
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.esocialsciences.org
analysis; regional; financial; framework;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-REG-2010-10-09 (Regulation)
- NEP-SEA-2010-10-09 (South East Asia)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- W. Braddock Hickman, 1958. "Index to "Corporate Bond Quality and Investor Experience"," NBER Chapters, in: Corporate Bond Quality and Investor Experience, pages 531-536 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kaplan, Robert S & Urwitz, Gabriel, 1979. "Statistical Models of Bond Ratings: A Methodological Inquiry," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(2), pages 231-61, April.
- Marcia H. Millon & Anjan V. Thakor, 2004.
"Moral Hazard and Information Sharing: A Model of Financial Information Gathering Agencies,"
- Millon, Marcia H & Thakor, Anjan V, 1985. " Moral Hazard and Information Sharing: A Model of Financial Information Gathering Agencies," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(5), pages 1403-22, December.
- Morgan, John & Stocken, Phillip C, 2003.
" An Analysis of Stock Recommendations,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 183-203, Spring.
- W. Braddock Hickman, 1958. "Introduction and Summary of Findings to "Corporate Bond Quality and Investor Experience"," NBER Chapters, in: Corporate Bond Quality and Investor Experience, pages 3-27 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kartik, Navin & Ottaviani, Marco & Squintani, Francesco, 2007. "Credulity, lies, and costly talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 93-116, May.
- Navin Kartik, 2008.
"Strategic Communication with Lying Costs,"
2008 Meeting Papers
350, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007.
"Exclusive versus non-exclusive licensing strategies and moral hazard,"
Elsevier, vol. 97(3), pages 208-214, December.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Exclusive versus Non-exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard," CEPR Discussion Papers 6207, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- repec:bla:restud:v:76:y:2009:i:4:p:1359-1395 is not listed on IDEAS
- Katz, Steven, 1974. "The Price Adjustment Process of Bonds to Rating Reclassifications: A Test of Bond Market Efficiency," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 29(2), pages 551-59, May.
- Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Eloïc Peyrache & Lucía Quesada, 2009.
"The ownership of ratings,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 234-257.
- Ingram, Robert W & Brooks, Leroy D & Copeland, Ronald M, 1983. " The Information Content of Municipal Bond Rating Changes: A Note," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 38(3), pages 997-1003, June.
- Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, 2009. "Misselling through Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 883-908, June.
- Farhi, Emmanuel & Lerner, Josh & Tirole, Jean, 2008.
"Fear of Rejection? Tiered Certification and Transparency,"
IDEI Working Papers
534, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Sep 2012.
- Emmanuel Farhi & Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2008. "Fear of Rejection? Tiered Certification and Transparency," NBER Working Papers 14457, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Innes, Robert D., 1990. "Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 45-67, October.
- Ang, James S & Patel, Kiritkumar A, 1975. "Bond Rating Methods: Comparison and Validation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 30(2), pages 631-40, May.
- Hand, John R M & Holthausen, Robert W & Leftwich, Richard W, 1992. " The Effect of Bond Rating Agency Announcements on Bond and Stock Prices," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(2), pages 733-52, June.
- Katz, Michael L & Shapiro, Carl, 1986. "How to License Intangible Property," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(3), pages 567-89, August.
- Grier, Paul & Katz, Steven, 1976. "The Differential Effects of Bond Rating Changes among Industrial and Public Utility Bonds by Maturity," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 49(2), pages 226-39, April.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Padma Prakash).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.