This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Spear, Stephen E.
Wang, Cheng

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Existing models of dynamic contracts impose that it is both optimal and feasible for the contracting parties to bind themselves together forever. This paper introduces optimal terminatin in dynamic contracts. We modify the standard dynamic agency model to include an external labor market which, upon the dissolution of the contract, allows the firm to return to the labor market to seek a new match. Under this simple closure of the model, two types of terminations emerge. Under one scenario, the agent is fired after a sequence of bad outputs and she becomes too poor to be punished effectively. Under the second scenario, the agent is forced out after a sequence of good outputs and she becomes too expensive to motivate. We then use the model to study issues of CEO termination and firm dynamics.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 11443.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 24 Feb 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2005, Vol. 120, pp. 239-256.
Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:11443

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070
Phone: +1 515.294.6741
Fax: +1 515.294.0221
Email:
Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Stephanie Bridges).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Wang, Cheng, 2005. "Termination of Dynamic Contracts in an Equilibrium Labor Market Model (2008 update)," Staff General Research Papers 12403, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6725, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Casamatta, Catherine & Gümbel, Alexander, 2007. "Managerial Legacies, Entrenchment and Strategic Inertia," IDEI Working Papers 442, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  4. Wang, Cheng, 2006. "Equilibrium Layoff as Termination of a Dynamic Contract," Staff General Research Papers 12704, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Leonardo Martinez, 2008. "A theory of political cycles," Working Paper 05-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
  6. Leonardo Martinez, 2009. "Reputation, career concerns, and job assignments," Working Paper 06-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? To receive notification of recent additions to the database, subscribe to the free NEP reports.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-21.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.