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Global Environmental Commons: Analytical and Political Challenges in Building Governance Mechanisms

Editor

Listed:
  • Brousseau, Eric
    (Professor of Economics and Management; University Paris-Dauphine and European University Institute)

  • Dedeurwaerdere, Tom
    (Professor, Universite Catholique de Louvain)

  • Jouvet, Pierre-Andre
    (Full Professor, Universite de Paris Ouest -Nanterre)

  • Willinger, Marc
    (Professor, Universite de Montpellier 1 and Institut Universitaire de France)

Abstract

Environmental challenges, and the potential solutions to address them, have a direct effect on living standards, the organization of economies, major infrastructures, and modes of urbanization. Since the publication of path-breaking contributions on the governance of environmental resources in the early 1990s, many political initiatives have been taken, numerous governance experiments have been conducted, and a large multi-disciplinary field of research has opened up. This interdisciplinary book takes stock of the knowledge that has accumulated to date, and addresses new challenges in the provision of environmental goods. It focuses on three essential dimensions with respect to governance. First, it addresses the issue of designing governance solutions through analyzing systems of rules, and levels of organization, in the governance and management of environmental issues. Second, it draws renewed attention to the negotiation processes among stakeholders playing a crucial role in reaching agreements over issues and solutions, and in choosing and implementing particular policy instruments. Finally, it shows that compliance depends on a combination of formal rules, enforced by recognized authorities, and informal obligations, such as social and individual norms. The evolution of the research frontiers on environmental governance shows that more legitimate and informed processes of collective decision, and more subtle and effective ways of managing compliance, can contribute to more effective policy. However, this book also illustrates that more democratic and effective governance should rely on more direct and pluralistic forms of involvement of citizens and stakeholders in the collective decision making processes Contributors to this volume - Thierry Brechet, Universite Catholique de Louvain, Belgium Eric Brousseau, Paris-Dauphine University and the European University Institute, Florence, Italy Graciela Chichilnisky, Columbia University, New York, USA Tom Dedeurwaerdere, Universite Catholique de Louvain, Belgium Denny Ellerman, European University Institute, Florence, Italy Johan Eyckmans, Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel (HUB), Belgium Michael Faure, Maastricht University, The Netherlands Rupert Gatti, Trinity College, University of Cambridge, UK Timo Goeschl, University of Heidelberg, Germany Ben Groom, SOAS, University of London, UK Hiroe Ishihara, University of Cambridge, UK Pierre-Andre Jouvet, Universite de Paris Ouest- Nanterre, France Gary Libecap, University of California, Santa Barbara, USA Paulo A. L. D. Nunes, Universite Catholique de Louvain, Belgium Laura Onofri, University of Venice, Ca'Foscari, Italy Elinor Ostrom, Indiana University, Bloomington, USA Unai Pascual, University of Cambridge, UK Charles Perrings, Arizona State University, USA Andries Richter, Wageningen University, The Netherlands Daan Van Soest, Tilburg University, The Netherlands Timothy Swanson, University College London, UK Arild Vatn, Norwegian University of Life Sciences (UMB), Norway Marc Willinger, University of Montpellier I, France Oran Young, University of California, Santa Barbara, USA

Suggested Citation

  • Brousseau, Eric & Dedeurwaerdere, Tom & Jouvet, Pierre-Andre & Willinger, Marc (ed.), 2012. "Global Environmental Commons: Analytical and Political Challenges in Building Governance Mechanisms," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199656202, Decembrie.
  • Handle: RePEc:oxp:obooks:9780199656202
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    2. Emmanouela Mandalaki & Marianna Fotaki, 2020. "The Bodies of the Commons: Towards a Relational Embodied Ethics of the Commons," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 166(4), pages 745-760, November.
    3. Frank Wijen & Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline, 2019. "Controversy Over Voluntary Environmental Standards: A Socioeconomic Analysis of the Marine Stewardship Council," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02071504, HAL.
    4. Woods, David D., 2015. "Four concepts for resilience and the implications for the future of resilience engineering," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 5-9.
    5. Tom Dedeurwaerdere, 2013. "Transdisciplinary Sustainability Science at Higher Education Institutions: Science Policy Tools for Incremental Institutional Change," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 5(9), pages 1-19, September.
    6. David D. Woods, 2018. "The theory of graceful extensibility: basic rules that govern adaptive systems," Environment Systems and Decisions, Springer, vol. 38(4), pages 433-457, December.
    7. Héloïse Berkowitz, 2023. "From organizations as systems of ocean destruction to organizations as systems of ocean thriving," Post-Print hal-04005729, HAL.

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