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Quality, experience, and monopoly: the Soviet market for weapons under Stalin -super-1

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  • ANDREI MARKEVICH
  • MARK HARRISON

Abstract

Monopoly is a particular problem in markets where experience goods are traded, since the consumer cannot respond to bad experiences by switching repeat purchases to another supplier. New evidence shows how the defence ministry as buyer in the Soviet market for military goods responded to this problem by investing in an evaluation of quality prior to purchase, by showing reluctance to buy, and by exploiting the available non-market means to influence the defence industry as supplier. The effectiveness of these stratagems was limited by the defence industry's counteractions and because the buyer had no choice but to come to a compromise with the supplier. Copyright Economic History Society 2005.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Economic History Society in its journal The Economic History Review.

Volume (Year): 59 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
Pages: 113-142

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Handle: RePEc:bla:ehsrev:v:59:y:2006:i:1:p:113-142

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Cited by:
  1. Harrison, Mark & Markevich, Andrei, 2007. "Quantity Versus Quality in the Soviet Market for Weapons," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 822, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  2. Andrei Markevich, 2007. "How Much Control is Enough? Monitoring and Enforcement under Stalin," Working Papers w0110, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
  3. repec:cge:warwcg:59 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Harrison, Mark, 2011. "Capitalism at War," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 60, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).

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