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Secrecy and State Capacity: A Look Behind the Iron Curtain

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  • Harrison, Mark

    (The University of Warwick)

Abstract

This paper reviews two decades of research on the political economy of secrecy, based on the records of former Soviet state and party archives. Secrecy was an element of Soviet state capacity, particularly its capacity for decisiveness, free of the pressures and demands for accountability that might have arisen from a better informed citizenry. But secrecy was double-edged. Its uses also incurred substantial costs that weakened the capacity of the Soviet state to direct and decide. The paper details the costs of secrecy associated with “conspirative” government business processes, adverse selection of management personnel, everyday abuses of authority, and an uninformed leadership.

Suggested Citation

  • Harrison, Mark, 2017. "Secrecy and State Capacity: A Look Behind the Iron Curtain," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 312, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cge:wacage:312
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    File URL: https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/manage/publications/312-2017_harrison.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2011. "Dictators And Their Viziers: Endogenizing The Loyalty–Competence Trade‐Off," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(5), pages 903-930, October.
    2. Andrei Markevich, 2011. "How Much Control is Enough? Monitoring and Enforcement under Stalin," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 63(8), pages 1449-1468.
    3. Mark Harrison, 2013. "Secrecy, Fear and Transaction Costs: The Business of Soviet Forced Labour in the Early Cold War," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 65(6), pages 1112-1135.
    4. Mark Harrison & Inga Zaksauskienė, 2016. "Counter-intelligence in a command economy," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 69(1), pages 131-158, February.
    5. Harrison, Mark, 2013. "Accounting for Secrets," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 73(4), pages 1017-1049, December.
    6. North,Douglass C. & Wallis,John Joseph & Weingast,Barry R., 2013. "Violence and Social Orders," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107646995, January.
    7. Mark Harrison & R. W. Davies, 1997. "The Soviet military‐economic effort during the second five‐year plan (1933–1937)," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(3), pages 369-406.
    8. R. W. Davies, 1993. "Soviet military expenditure and the armaments industry, 1929–33: A reconsideration," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(4), pages 577-608.
    9. Harrison, Mark, 2011. "Forging success: Soviet managers and accounting fraud, 1943-1962," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 43-64, March.
    10. Mark Dincecco & Gabriel Katz, 2016. "State Capacity and Long‐run Economic Performance," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 126(590), pages 189-218, February.
    11. Daron Acemoglu & Leopoldo Fergusson & James Robinson & Dario Romero & Juan F. Vargas, 2020. "The Perils of High-Powered Incentives: Evidence from Colombia's False Positives," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 1-43, August.
    12. Andrei Markevich & Mark Harrison, 2006. "Quality, experience, and monopoly: the Soviet market for weapons under Stalin," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 59(1), pages 113-142, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    abuse of authority; adverse selection; censorship; military outlays; secrecy; state capacity; transaction costs; trust JEL Classification: N44; P37;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N44 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: 1913-
    • P37 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Legal

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