Minimum Wages and Excessive Effort Supply

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Minimum Wages and Excessive Effort Supply

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Matthias Kräkel () (University of Bonn)
Anja Schöttner () (University of Bonn)

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Abstract

It is well-known that, in static models, minimum wages generate positive worker rents and, consequently, ineffciently low effort. We show that this result does not necessarily extend to a dynamic context. The reason is that, in repeated employment relationships, ﬁrms may exploit workers’ future rents to induce excessively high effort. Creation-Date: 2009-07

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Paper provided by SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Papers with number 264.

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Paper
- Matthias Kräkel & Anja Schöttner, 2009. "Minimum Wages and Excessive Effort Supply," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse8_2009, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(6), pages 727-738, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse25_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6725, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-16.

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