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Wall Street Occupations

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  • ULF AXELSON
  • PHILIP BOND

Abstract

type="main"> Many finance jobs entail the risk of large losses, and hard-to-monitor effort. We analyze the equilibrium consequences of these features in a model with optimal dynamic contracting. We show that finance jobs feature high compensation, up-or-out promotion, and long work hours, and are more attractive than other jobs. Moral hazard problems are exacerbated in booms, even though pay increases. Employees whose talent would be more valuable elsewhere can be lured into finance jobs, while the most talented employees might be unable to land these jobs because they are “too hard to manage.”

Suggested Citation

  • Ulf Axelson & Philip Bond, 2015. "Wall Street Occupations," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(5), pages 1949-1996, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:70:y:2015:i:5:p:1949-1996
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