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A Model of Moral-Hazard Credit Cycles

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  • Roger B. Myerson

Abstract

This paper considers a simple model of credit cycles driven by moral hazard in financial intermediation. Financial agents or bankers must earn moral-hazard rents, but the cost of these rents can be efficiently spread over an agent's entire career by promising large late-career rewards if the agent has a consistently successful record. Dynamic interactions among different generations of financial agents can create credit cycles with repeated booms and recessions. In recessions, a scarcity of trusted financial intermediaries limits investment and reduces employment. Under such conditions, taxing workers to subsidize bankers may increase employment enough to make the workers better off.

Suggested Citation

  • Roger B. Myerson, 2012. "A Model of Moral-Hazard Credit Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(5), pages 847-878.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/668839
    DOI: 10.1086/668839
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    2. Giovanni Favara, 2012. "Agency Problems and Endogenous Investment Fluctuations," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(7), pages 2301-2342.
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    Cited by:

    1. Spiros Bougheas & Pasquale Commendatore & Laura Gardini & Ingrid Kubin, 2022. "Financial Development, Cycles and Income Inequality in a Model with Good and Bad Projects," CESifo Working Paper Series 10135, CESifo.
    2. Myerson, Roger B., 2014. "Moral-hazard credit cycles with risk-averse agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 74-102.
    3. Kazuo Nishimura & Florian Pelgrin & Alain Venditti, 2022. "Medium term endogenous fluctuations in three-sector optimal growth models," Working Papers hal-03923999, HAL.
    4. Pelgrin, Florian & Venditti, Alain, 2022. "On the long-run fluctuations of inheritance in two-sector OLG models," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    5. Hashimoto, Ken-ichi & Im, Ryonghun & Kunieda, Takuma & Shibata, Akihisa, 2022. "Financial destabilization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
    6. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Yuliy Sannikov, 2016. "Macro, Money and Finance: A Continuous Time Approach," NBER Working Papers 22343, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Takao Asano & Masanori Yokoo, 2017. "Chaotic Dynamics of a Piecewise Linear Model of Credit Cycles with Imperfect Observability," KIER Working Papers 967, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    8. Matsuyama, Kiminori & Sushko, Iryna & Gardini, Laura, 2016. "Revisiting the model of credit cycles with Good and Bad projects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 525-556.
    9. Farboodi, Maryam & Kondor, Péter, 2023. "Cleansing by tight credit: Rational cycles and endogenous lending standards," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(1), pages 46-67.
    10. Azariadis, Costas, 2014. "Credit Policy in times of Financial Distress," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 39(PB), pages 337-345.
    11. Axelson, Ulf & Bond, Philip, 2015. "Wall Street occupations," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 37448, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    12. Rohit Lamba & Ilia Krasikov, 2017. "A Theory of Dynamic Contracting with Financial Constraints," 2017 Meeting Papers 1544, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    13. Guerrieri, V. & Uhlig, H., 2016. "Housing and Credit Markets," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1427-1496, Elsevier.
    14. Brunnermeier, M.K. & Sannikov, Y., 2016. "Macro, Money, and Finance," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1497-1545, Elsevier.
    15. Maryam Farboodi & Péter Kondor, 2020. "Rational Sentiments and Economic Cycles," NBER Working Papers 27472, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Simona Nistor & Steven Ongena, 2023. "The Impact of Policy Interventions on Systemic Risk across Banks," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 64(2), pages 155-206, October.
    17. Ulf Axelson & Philip Bond, 2015. "Wall Street Occupations," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(5), pages 1949-1996, October.
    18. Zachary Bethune & Tai-Wei Hu & Guillaume Rocheteau, 2018. "Optimal Credit Cycles," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 27, pages 231-245, January.
    19. Kikuchi, Tomoo & Stachurski, John & Vachadze, George, 2018. "Volatile capital flows and financial integration: The role of moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 170-192.
    20. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Jaume García-Segarra & Alexander Ritschel, 2018. "The Big Robber Game," ECON - Working Papers 291, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    21. Figueroa, Nicolás & Leukhina, Oksana, 2018. "Cash flows and credit cycles," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 318-332.
    22. Damaris W. Muhika & Agnes W. Njeru & Esther Waiganjo, 2017. "Influence of Financial Reporting Requirement on Formalizing Small and Medium Enterprises in Kenya," International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, Human Resource Management Academic Research Society, International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, vol. 7(7), pages 83-100, July.
    23. Azariadis, Costas & Choi, Kyoung Jin, 2013. "Credit crunches as markov equilibria," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 38(PA), pages 2-11.

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