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CEO successor compensation: outside versus inside successions

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Author Info

  • Eahab Elsaid

    ()

  • Wallace Davidson

    ()

  • Xiaoxin Wang

    ()

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    Abstract

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10997-009-9095-8
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Management & Governance.

    Volume (Year): 15 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 2 (May)
    Pages: 187-205

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:15:y:2011:i:2:p:187-205

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102940

    Related research

    Keywords: Corporate governance; CEO compensation; Inside and outside CEO successor;

    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, October.
    2. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
    3. Baysinger, Barry D & Butler, Henry N, 1985. "Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 101-24, Spring.
    4. Bryan, Stephen & Hwang, LeeSeok & Lilien, Steven, 2000. "CEO Stock-Based Compensation: An Empirical Analysis of Incentive-Intensity, Relative Mix, and Economic Determinants," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73(4), pages 661-93, October.
    5. Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, 2008. "Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 123(1), pages 49-100, 02.
    6. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 1996. "Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO," Microeconomics 9602001, EconWPA, revised 09 Oct 1996.
    7. Klibanoff, Peter & Morduch, Jonathan, 1995. "Decentralization, Externalities, and Efficiency," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(2), pages 223-47, April.
    8. Bullard, James & Feigenbaum, James, 2007. "A leisurely reading of the life-cycle consumption data," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 2305-2320, November.
    9. Morgan, Angela G. & Poulsen, Annette B., 2001. "Linking pay to performance--compensation proposals in the S&P 500," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 489-523, December.
    10. Ryan, Harley Jr. & Wiggins, Roy III, 2001. "The influence of firm- and manager-specific characteristics on the structure of executive compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 101-123, June.
    11. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 12530, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Caputo,Michael R., 2005. "Foundations of Dynamic Economic Analysis," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521842723, October.
    13. Toyne, Michael F. & Millar, James A. & Dixon, Bruce L., 2000. "The relation between CEO control and the risk of CEO compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 291-306, September.
    14. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2003. "Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Apr, pages 7-26.
    15. Harry A. Newman & Haim A. Mozes, 1999. "Does the Composition of the Compensation Committee Influence CEO Compensation Practices?," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 28(3), Fall.
    16. Kevin J. Murphy & Ján Zábojník, 2004. "CEO Pay and Appointments: A Market-Based Explanation for Recent Trends," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 192-196, May.
    17. David Yermack, 2004. "Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(5), pages 2281-2308, October.
    18. Edward J. Lawler & Samuel B. Bacharach, 1979. "Power dependence in individual bargaining: The expected utility of influence," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 32(2), pages 196-204, January.
    19. Abhinay Muthoo, 2000. "A Non-technical Introduction to Bargaining Theory," World Economics, World Economics, Economic & Financial Publishing, 1 Ivory Square, Plantation Wharf, London, United Kingdom, SW11 3UE, vol. 1(2), pages 145-166, April.
    20. Hamish Low, 2005. "Self-Insurance in a Life-Cycle Model of Labor Supply and Savings," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 8(4), pages 945-975, October.
    21. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 169-188, January.
    22. Kevin J. Murphy & Jan Zabojnik, 2006. "Managerial Capital and the Market for CEOs," Working Papers 1110, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    23. Wallace Davidson & Carol Nemec & Dan Worrell & Jun Lin, 2002. "Industrial Origin of CEOs in Outside Succession: Board Preference and Stockholder Reaction," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 295-321, December.
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