On the Release of Players to National Teams
AbstractThe release of players from a club to the national team often leads to a conflict concerning the duration of the players' stay with the national team. Based on a theoretical bargaining model, we examine whether intervention in this conflict by a governing body is desirable. We show that bargaining between the club and the national team yields a socially inefficient outcome if financial compensation is either prohibited or limited. If, however, the national team is allowed to pay unlimited financial compensation to the club, it is not necessary to intervene in the negotiations because the bargaining outcome will be socially optimal.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Association of Sports Economists & North American Association of Sports Economists in its series Working Papers with number 1124.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2011
Date of revision:
National team; release of players; compensation payment; bargaining; team sports;
Other versions of this item:
- Oliver Guertler & Markus Lang & Tim Pawlowski, 2011. "On the Release of Players to National Teams," Working Papers 0151, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
- Oliver Guertler & Markus Lang & Tim Pawlowski, 2011. "On the Release of Players to National Teams," Working Papers 0045, University of Zurich, Center for Research in Sports Administration (CRSA).
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Recreation; Tourism
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006.
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American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 5417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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