Unmöglichkeitstheoreme bei asymmetrischer Information
AbstractThis paper illustrates in a simple model how the presence of asymmetric information can make it impossible to achieve ex post efficient trade decisions in negotiations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 6934.
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium 32.4(2003): pp. 239-242
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1981.
"Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading,"
Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
469S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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