Response Time under Monetary Incentives: the Ultimatum Game
AbstractThis paper studies the response times of experimental subjects playing the Ultimatum game in a laboratory setting using monetary incentives. We find that proposals are not significantly correlated with response time, whereas responders' behavior is positively and significantly correlated. Hence, consistent with Rubisntein (forthcoming) we find that response times may capture relevant cognitive processes. However, the use of monetary incentives causes a reversal of his findings. These results have implications for the information about cognitive mechanisms that can be obtained from response times.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2007-070.
Date of creation: 25 Sep 2007
Date of revision:
Monetary incentives; Ultimatum game; response time;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-10-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2007-10-06 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2007-10-06 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2007-10-06 (Game Theory)
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- Marco Piovesan & Erik Wengström, 2008.
"Fast or Fair? A Study of Response Times,"
08-09, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Astrid Matthey & Tobias Regner, 2010.
"Do I really want to know? A cognitive dissonance-based explanation of other-regarding behavior,"
Jena Economic Research Papers
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- Astrid Matthey & Tobias Regner, 2011. "Do I Really Want to Know? A Cognitive Dissonance-Based Explanation of Other-Regarding Behavior," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 2(1), pages 114-135, February.
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