Expected Behavior and Strategic Sophistication in the Dictator Game
AbstractThis paper provides novel results for the extensive literature on dictator games: recipients do not expect dictators to behave selfishly, but instead expect the equal split division. The predictions made by dictators are notably different: 45% predicted the zero contribution and 40% the equal split. These results suggest that dictators and recipients are heterogenous with regard to their degree of strategic sophistication and identify the dictator's decision power in a very different manner.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Valencia, ERI-CES in its series Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour with number 0412.
Date of creation: Jul 2012
Date of revision:
expectations; strategic sophistication; dictator game; equal; split; guessing;
Other versions of this item:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-07-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2012-07-29 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2012-07-29 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2012-07-29 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-07-29 (Game Theory)
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