The role of power for distributive fairness
AbstractWe employ an experimental labour setting to study fairness in the division of gains from productive activity. The focus is on the impact of power structures on allocation decisions and on fairness perceptions. Two types of actors are involved in generating a gain, but only one contributes actively by completing a real-effort task. In three treatments, decision power to divide the gain is assigned (1) to the inactive, (2) jointly to the inactive and the active, and (3) to the active. Results show that the impact of power goes beyond changing final allocations: it also significantly alters fairness perceptions. Decision power - in particular absolute power – mediates and significantly enhances self-serving biases. Results complement studies on the psychology of fairness perceptions. Moreover, the paper discusses implications for organizational design.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim in its series Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications with number 07-71.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 12 Dec 2007
Date of revision:
Note: The authors thank Robin Hogarth, Nagore Iriberri, Rosemarie Nagel, Jordi Brandts, James Konow, Daniel Schunk as well as seminar participants at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Universität Mannheim, Universität Konstanz and the ESA North American Meeting 2007 for their constructive comments. Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-04-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2008-04-04 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2008-04-04 (Labour Economics)
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- Pablo Brañas-Garza, 2008.
"Expected Behavior in the Dictator Game,"
08/12, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
- Ismael Rodriguez-Lara & Pablo Brañas-Garza, 2012. "Expected Behavior and Strategic Sophistication in the Dictator Game," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0412, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
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