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Justice under uncertainty

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Author Info

  • Riedl A.M.
  • Cettolin E.

    (GSBE)

Abstract

An important element for the public support of policies is their perceived justice. At the same time most policy choices have uncertain outcomes. We report the results of a first experiment investigating just allocations of resources when some recipients are exposed to uncertainty. Although, under certainty almost all uninvolved participants distribute resources equally, they exhibit remarkable heterogeneity in just allocations under uncertainty. Moreover, uninvolved participants allocate on average less to recipients exposed to higher degrees of uncertainty and allocations are correlated with their own risk preferences. The observed allocations are consistent with four different views of justice under uncertainty.

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File URL: http://pub.maastrichtuniversity.nl/5174c428-e10b-4e45-95b4-56e27ee02c45
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE) in its series Research Memorandum with number 036.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013036

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Postal: P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht
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Web page: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/
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Keywords: Design of Experiments: Laboratory; Individual; Equity; Justice; Inequality; and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Anke Gerber & Andreas Nicklisch & Stefan Voigt, 2013. "Strategic Choices for Redistribution and the Veil of Ignorance: Theory and Experimental Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 4423, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Doerrenberg, Philipp & Duncan, Denvil, 2012. "Experimental Evidence on the Relationship between Tax Evasion Opportunities and Labor Supply," IZA Discussion Papers 6914, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

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