An experimental device to elicit social networks
AbstractThis paper proposes an original mechanism to elicit latent social networks. Subjects are invited to reveal their friends’ name and surname, together with a score measuring the strength of relationship. According to the mechanism, subjects are rewarded of a fixed price either a) when they do not name anybody or b) when the scores of a randomly selected (bidirectional) link are sufficiently close. We test the mechanism’s performance in the field. Our main results are: i) a very large percentage of links (75%) were corresponded. ii) the mechanism largely captures strong friendship relations and practically ignores weak relations. A simple model of friend—regarding preferences is developed to explain this evidence.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada. in its series ThE Papers with number 05/19.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 12 Sep 2005
Date of revision:
friendship; networks; experiments; other—regarding preferences.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-09-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2005-09-29 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2005-09-29 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2005-09-29 (Game Theory)
- NEP-NET-2005-09-29 (Network Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2005-09-29 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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