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Bargaining and network structure: An experiment Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Charness, Gary
Corominas-Bosch, Margarida
Frechette, Guillaume R.
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory .
Volume (Year): 136 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 28-65
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:136:y:2007:i:1:p:28-65Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
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"Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers ,"
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"Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining ,"
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"Bargaining efficiency and screening: an experimental investigation ,"
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Dean Corbae & John Duffy, 2003.
"Experiments with Network Formation ,"
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666156000000000319, David K. Levine.
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John Duffy & Dean Corbae, 2006.
"Experiments with Network Formation ,"
Working Papers
292, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2007.
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"Experiments with network formation ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 81-120, September.
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"It's All About Connections: Evidence on Network Formation ,"
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Other versions: Gary Charness & Antonio Cabrales, 2008.
"Optimal Contracts With Team Production And Hidden Information: An Experiment ,"
University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series
12-08, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
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Other versions: Shachar Kariv & Douglas Gale, 2007.
"Trading in Networks: A Normal Form Game Experiment ,"
Levine's Bibliography
843644000000000114, UCLA Department of Economics.
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Other versions: Falk, Armin & Fischbacher, Urs & Gächter, Simon, 2004.
"Living in Two Neighborhoods: Social Interactions in the Lab ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
1381, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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Other versions: Pablo Brañas-Garza & Ramón Cobo-Reyes & Natalia Jiménez & Giovanni Ponti, 2005.
"An experimental device to elicit social networks ,"
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Antoni Rubí-Barceló, 2008.
"Structural holes and densely connected communities ,"
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Michael Kosfeld, .
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