Promoting justice by treating people unequally: an experimental study
AbstractWhich inequalities among individuals are considered unjust? This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to study distributive choices dealing with arbitrarily unequal initial endowments. In a three-person distribution problem where subjects either know or do not know their endowments, we Ã¯Â¬nd impartial behavior to be a stable pattern. Subjects either compensate for initial inequalities fully or not at all in both conditions, and they do so more often when they do not know their endowment than when they know it. Moreover, the type and the size of the good to be distributed also aÃ¯Â¬â¬ect the frequency of impartial behavior.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Experimental Economics.
Volume (Year): 12 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102888
Veil of ignorance; Impartial behavior; Distributive justice; Procedural fairness; C72; C92;
Other versions of this item:
- Alice Becker & Luis M. Miller, 2009. "Promoting Justice by Treating People Unequally: An Experimental Study," Jena Economic Research Papers 2009-008, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
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