Generosity, Greed and Gambling: What difference does asymmetric information in bargaining make?
AbstractWe analyze the effects of asymmetric information concerning the size of a pie on proposer behavior in three different bargaining situations: the ultimatum game, the Yes-No-game and the dictator game. Our data show that (a) irrespective of the information condition, proposer generosity increases with responder veto power, (b) informed proposers in the ultimatum game try to exploit their superior information and hide their greed by a seemingly fair offer, and (c) uninformed proposers in the dictator game exhibit gambling behavior by asking for more than potentially is at stake. While the results of our experimental analysis are interesting as such, they may also yield interesting practical implications.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2009-021.
Date of creation: 23 Mar 2009
Date of revision:
Bargaining; Information; Experimental Games;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics; Underlying Principles
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-03-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2009-03-28 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2009-03-28 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EXP-2009-03-28 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2009-03-28 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2009-03-28 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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- Winschel, Evguenia & Zahn, Philipp, 2014. "When Ignorance is Bliss* : Information Asymmetries Enhance Prosocial Behavior in Dicator Games," Working Papers 13-07, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
- Winschel, Evguenia & Zahn, Philipp, 2012. "Effciency Concern under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 13-07, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
- Astrid Matthey & Tobias Regner, 2013. "On the independence of history: experience spill-overs between experiments," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(3), pages 403-419, September.
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