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Generosity, Greed and Gambling: What difference does asymmetric information in bargaining make?

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Author Info

  • Charlotte Klempt

    (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena)

  • Kerstin Pull

    ()
    (University of Tübingen, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration)

Abstract

We analyze the effects of asymmetric information concerning the size of a pie on proposer behavior in three different bargaining situations: the ultimatum game, the Yes-No-game and the dictator game. Our data show that (a) irrespective of the information condition, proposer generosity increases with responder veto power, (b) informed proposers in the ultimatum game try to exploit their superior information and hide their greed by a seemingly fair offer, and (c) uninformed proposers in the dictator game exhibit gambling behavior by asking for more than potentially is at stake. While the results of our experimental analysis are interesting as such, they may also yield interesting practical implications.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2009-021.

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Date of creation: 23 Mar 2009
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Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2009-021

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Related research

Keywords: Bargaining; Information; Experimental Games;

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Cited by:
  1. Winschel, Evguenia & Zahn, Philipp, 2014. "When Ignorance is Bliss* : Information Asymmetries Enhance Prosocial Behavior in Dicator Games," Working Papers, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics 13-07, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
  2. Astrid Matthey & Tobias Regner, 2013. "On the independence of history: experience spill-overs between experiments," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 75(3), pages 403-419, September.
  3. Winschel, Evguenia & Zahn, Philipp, 2012. "Effciency Concern under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics 13-07, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.

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