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An evaluation of learning in the bilateral winner's curse Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Ball, Sheryl B.
Bazerman, Max H.
Carroll, John S.
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes .
Volume (Year): 48 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 1-22
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jobhdp:v:48:y:1991:i:1:p:1-22Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/obhdp
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