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Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Ostrovsky, Michael (Stanford U)
Schwarz, Michael (Yahoo! Research)
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This paper explores information disclosure in matching markets, e.g., the informativeness of transcripts given out by universities. We show that the same, “benchmark,” amount of information is disclosed in essentially all equilibria. We then demonstrate that if universities disclose the benchmark amount of information, students and employers will not find it profitable to contract early; if they disclose more, unraveling will occur.
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Paper provided by Stanford University, Graduate School of Business in its series Research Papers with number
1965.
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Date of creation: Apr 2007Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:1965Contact details of provider: Postal: Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5015 Phone: (650) 723-2146 Fax: (650)725-6750 Email: Web page: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/ More information through EDIRC
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Alessandro Lizzeri, 1999.
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ESE Discussion Papers
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