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Interviews and Adverse Selection

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Author Info
Jens Josephson
Joel Shapiro ()

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Abstract

Interviewing in professional labor markets is a costly process for firms. Moreover, poor screening can have a persistent negative impact on firms’ bottom lines and candidates’ careers. In a simple dynamic model where firms can pay a cost to interview applicants who have private information about their own ability, potentially large inefficiencies arise from information-based unemployment, where able workers are rejected by firms because of their lack of offers in previous interviews. This effect may make the market less efficient than random matching. We show that the first best can be achieved using either a mechanism with transfers or one without transfers.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 1093.

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Date of creation: May 2008
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Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:1093

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Related research
Keywords: Decentralized Labor Markets; Professional Labor Markets; Asymmetric Information; Interview costs; Matching;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Li, Hao & Rosen, Sherwin, 1998. "Unraveling in Matching Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 371-87, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Farber, Henry S & Gibbons, Robert, 1996. "Learning and Wage Dynamics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(4), pages 1007-47, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Josephson, Jens & Shapiro, Joel, 2008. "Interviews and Adverse Selection," CEPR Discussion Papers 6837, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Alvin E Roth & Muriel Niederle, 2007. "Making Markets Thick: Designing Rules for Offers and Acceptances," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000142, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Roth, Alvin E & Xing, Xiaolin, 1994. "Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 992-1044, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Damiano, Ettore & Li, Hao & Suen, Wing, 2004. "Unraveling of Dynamic Sorting," Micro Theory Working Papers damiano-04-08-11-03-02-02, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 11 Aug 2004. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Wing Suen, 2000. "A Competitive Theory of Equilibrium and Disequilibrium Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(1), pages 101-120, Spring.
  8. Leonard, Herman B, 1983. "Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 461-79, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Paul Oyer, 2006. "Initial Labor Market Conditions and Long-Term Outcomes for Economists," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(3), pages 143-160, Summer.
  10. Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2004. "Self-Fulfilling Early-Contracting Rush," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(1), pages 301-324, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2003. "Course Bidding at Business Schools," Game Theory and Information 0306001, EconWPA, revised 02 Jan 2004. [Downloadable!]
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Jens Josephson & Joel Shapiro, 2008. "Interviews and Adverse Selection," Economics Working Papers 1093, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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