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Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation

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Author Info

  • Daughety, A.
  • Reinganum, J.

Abstract

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Iowa, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 91-23.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 1991
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uia:iowaec:91-23

Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of Iowa, Department of Economics, Henry B. Tippie College of Business, Iowa City, Iowa 52242
Phone: (319) 335-0829
Fax: (319) 335-1956
Web page: http://tippie.uiowa.edu/economics/
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Related research

Keywords: economic equilibrium ; settlement pattern;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994. "Settlement Negotiations with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information Distribution and Efficiency," Game Theory and Information 9403009, EconWPA.
  2. Marco, Alan C. & Walsh, Kieran J., 2006. "Bargaining in the shadow of precedent: the surprising irrelevance of asymmetric stakes," Vassar College Department of Economics Working Paper Series 81, Vassar College Department of Economics.
  3. Kima, Jeong-Yoo & Ryu, Keunkwan, 2000. "Pretrial negotiation behind open doors versus closed doors:: Economic analysis of Rule 408," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 285-294, June.
  4. Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, 1996. "The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothesis: Case Selection and Resolution," NBER Working Papers 5649, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1995. "Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(2), pages 203-221, Summer.
  6. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2014. "Settlement and Trial: Selected Analyses of the Bargaining Environment," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 14-00006, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  7. W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006. "Reputations, relationships and the enforcement of incomplete contracts," Discussion Papers 0506-23, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  8. Luigi Alberto Franzoni, 1995. "Prosecutorial Discretion and Criminal Deterrence," Working Papers 234, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  9. Yang, Bill Z., 1996. "Litigation, experimentation, and reputation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 491-502, December.
  10. Miceli, Thomas J., 1999. "Settlement delay as a sorting device," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 265-274, June.
  11. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:11:y:2007:i:1:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. repec:fth:prinin:364 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Christopher C. Klein, 2007. "Anticompetitive Litigation and Antitrust Liability," Working Papers 200713, Middle Tennessee State University, Department of Economics and Finance.
  14. W. Bentley MacLeod, 2007. "Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(3), pages 595-628, September.
  15. Schwab, Christian & Tang, Hin-Yue Benny, 2011. "Die Steuerungswirkungen unterschiedlicher Prozesskostenregelungen: Ein √úberblick zum Stand von Theorie und Empirie
    [The economic effects of alternative fee shifting rules: A review of the theoreti
    ," MPRA Paper 32746, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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