Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation

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Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation

Author Info

Daughety, A.
Reinganum, J.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Iowa, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 91-23.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 1991
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uia:iowaec:91-23

Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of Iowa, Department of Economics, Henry B. Tippie College of Business, Iowa City, Iowa 52242
Phone: (319) 335-0829
Fax: (319) 335-1956
Web page: http://tippie.uiowa.edu/economics/
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Other versions of this item:

Article
- Daughety, Adnrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1993. "Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 314-48, October.

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Christopher C. Klein, 2007. "Anticompetitive Litigation and Antitrust Liability," Working Papers 200713, Middle Tennessee State University, Department of Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, 1996. "The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothesis: Case Selection and Resolution," NBER Working Papers 5649, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Benoit, J.P. & Kornhauser, L.A., 1996. "Game Theoretic Analysis of Legal Rules and Institutions," Working Papers 96-30, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006. "Reputations, relationships and the enforcement of incomplete contracts," Discussion Papers 0506-23, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006. "Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 1978, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
- W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006. "Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994. "Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations As Evidence in Court," Game Theory and Information 9403008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Daughety, A. & Reinganum, J., 1991. "Keeping Society in the Dark : On the Admissibility of Pretrial Nogotiations as Evidence in Court," Working Papers 91-24, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Daughety, Andrew & Reinganum, Jennifer, 1994. "Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court," Working Papers 94-06, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1995. "Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(2), pages 203-221, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Luigi Alberto Franzoni, 1995. "Prosecutorial Discretion and Criminal Deterrence," Working Papers 234, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
Alan Marco & Kieran Walsh, 2007. "Credibility and Credulity: How Beliefs about Beliefs Affect Entry Incentives," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 11(1), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994. "Settlement Negotiations with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information Distribution and Efficiency," Game Theory and Information 9403009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Daughety, Andrew F. & Reinganum, Jennifer F., 1994. "Settlement negotiations with two-sided asymmetric information: Model duality, information distribution, and efficiency," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 283-298, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Marco, Alan C. & Walsh, Kieran J., 2006. "Bargaining in the shadow of precedent: the surprising irrelevance of asymmetric stakes," Vassar College Department of Economics Working Paper Series 81, Vassar College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
repec:fth:prinin:364 is not listed on IDEAS
Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, 1996. "The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothesis: Case Selection and Resolution," Working Papers 743, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]

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