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Credible Pretrial Negotiation

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Author Info
Barry Nalebuff

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Abstract

Pretrial negotiation is a structured environment in which to study bargaining with incomplete information. When a plaintiff believes that a defendant owes him damages, he may first attempt to reach a private settlement before resorting to a costly court-imposed judgment. A central issue in their negotiations is whether the plaintiff's threat to litigate is credible. It is possible for the plaintiff to undermine the credibility of his litigation threat by making a settlement demand that is insufficient. As a result, the plaintiff must raise his settlement demand to limit the amount of bad news he can learn if his offer is rejected. When this credibility constraint is binding, traditional comparative static results are reversed. In addition, even though the defendant is being sued, he wants the plaintiff's threat to be credible.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 18 (1987)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
Pages: 198-210
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:18:y:1987:i:summer:p:198-210

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  1. Joel Waldfogel, 1998. "Reconciling Asymmetric Information and Divergent Expectations Theories of Litigation," NBER Working Papers 6409, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Christopher C. Klein, 2007. "Anticompetitive Litigation and Antitrust Liability," Working Papers 200713, Middle Tennessee State University, Department of Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
  3. Timothy S. Simcoe & Stuart J.H. Graham & Maryann Feldman, 2007. "Competing on Standards? Entrepreneurship, Intellectual Property and the Platform Paradox," NBER Working Papers 13632, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Richard Boylan & Cheryl Xiaoning Long, 2000. "Size, Monitoring and Plea Rate: An Examination of United States Attorneys," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0089, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  5. Alexander Stremitzer, 2008. "Plaintiffs exploiting Plaintiffs," Discussion Papers 224, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Tracy Lewis & Michel Poitevin, 1995. "Disclosure of Information in Regulatory Proceedings," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-01, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Álvaro Bustos & Ronen Avraham., 2008. "The Unexpected Effects of Caps on Non-Economic Damages," Documentos de Trabajo 353, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.. [Downloadable!]
  8. Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, 1996. "Preliminary Injunctive Relief: Theory and Evidence from Patent Litigation," NBER Working Papers 5689, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Deffains, Bruno & Langlais, Eric, 2008. "Legal Interpretative Process and Litigants’ Cognitive Biases," MPRA Paper 14370, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994. "Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations As Evidence in Court," Game Theory and Information 9403008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Kathryn Spier, 2001. "The Use of "Most-Favored-Nation" Clauses in Settlement of Litigation," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1024, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Roland Kirstein & Neil Rickman, . "Third Party Contingency contracts in settlement and litigation," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2002-1-1038, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
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  13. repec:bep:rlecon:2:2007:3:2 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Pao-Li Chang, 2007. "The Evolution and Utilization of the GATT/WTO Dispute," Working Papers 21-2007, Singapore Management University, School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  15. Pao-Li Chang, 2002. "The Evolution and Utilization of the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism," Working Papers 475, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan. [Downloadable!]
  16. Alberto Casagrande & Marco Spallone, 2007. "Investigating the determinants of pretrial settlement rates: contingent versus non-contingent lawyers’ fees," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 1-13, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Davis S. Kaplan & Joyce Sadka & Jorge Luis Silva-Mendez, 2006. "Litigation and Settlement: New Evidence from Labor Courts in Mexico," Working Papers 0606, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM. [Downloadable!]
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  18. repec:bep:eapcon:v:3:y:2004:i:1:p:1202-1202 is not listed on IDEAS
  19. Dequiedt, V., 2006. "Ratification and veto constraints in mechanism design," Working Papers 200606, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL). [Downloadable!]
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