This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
I.P.L. P'ng

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Previous studies of litigation have sidestepped the strategic element in the decisions to file suit, and to settle or go to trial. This article develops a model of strategic behavior in litigation, which reveals how information is exploited and how the litigants' strategies are interdependent. The model is analyzed to derive conditions on the parameters under which suit is filed, action is settled, and the action is tried. Further, it is applied to begin to study the question of whether there is excessive litigation in the U.S. legal system. It is found that in certain cases, the outcome of the litigation process does not satisfy private efficiency; that is, in some cases, even ignoring effects on the rest of society, the outcome is not efficient for the litigants.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0361-915X%28198323%2914%3A2%3C539%3ASBISSA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X&origin=repec
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal Bell Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 14 (1983)
Issue (Month): 2 (Autumn)
Pages: 539-550
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:rje:bellje:v:14:y:1983:i:autumn:p:539-550

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rje.org

Order Information:
Web: http://gemini.econ.umd.edu/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Hege, U. & Viala, P., 1997. "Contentious contracts," Discussion Paper 109, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Tracy Lewis & Michel Poitevin, 1995. "Disclosure of Information in Regulatory Proceedings," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-01, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, 1997. "The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A Survey of the Empirical Literature," NBER Working Papers 6296, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Benoit, J.P. & Kornhauser, L.A., 1996. "Game Theoretic Analysis of Legal Rules and Institutions," Working Papers 96-30, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  5. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno Deffains, 2006. "Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process," Working Papers of BETA 2006-11, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Jean O Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, 2004. "The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A Survey of the Literature," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000486, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  7. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994. "Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations As Evidence in Court," Game Theory and Information 9403008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1987. "Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer," NBER Working Papers 2161, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Chris William Sanchirico, 2004. "Games, Information, and Evidence Production: With Application to English Legal History," Law and Economics 0403002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  10. Pao-Li Chang, 2007. "The Evolution and Utilization of the GATT/WTO Dispute," Working Papers 21-2007, Singapore Management University, School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Eric Rasmusen, 1995. "``Predictable and Unpredictable Error in Tort Awards: The Effect of Plaintiff Self Selection and Signalling,''," Law and Economics 9506003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  12. Davis S. Kaplan & Joyce Sadka & Jorge Luis Silva-Mendez, 2006. "Litigation and Settlement: New Evidence from Labor Courts in Mexico," Working Papers 0606, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994. "Settlement Negotiations with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information Distribution and Efficiency," Game Theory and Information 9403009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Jean Olson Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, 1998. "Stylised Fact of Patent Litigation: Value, Scope and Ownership," STICERD - Economics of Industry Papers 20, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Springer Verlag was the first commercial publisher to be listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-13.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.