Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data
AbstractWe develop a private-information model of union contract negotiations in which disputes signal a firm's willingness to pay. Previous models have assumed that all labor disputes take the form of a strike. Yet a prominent feature of U.S. collective bargaining is the holdout: negotiations often continue without a strike after the contract has expired. Production continues with workers paid according to the expired contract. We analyze the union's decision to strike or hold out and highlight its importance to strike activity. Strikes are more likely to occur after a drop in the real wage or a decline in unemployment.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton in its series Papers of Peter Cramton with number 92aer.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1992
Date of revision: 09 Jun 1998
Publication status: Published in American Economic Review, 82:1, March 1992, pages 100-121. Reprinted in Bengt Holmstrom, Paul Milgrom, and Alvin E. Roth, eds., Game Theory in the Tradition of Bob Wilson, Berkeley Electronic Press, www.bepress.com/wilson, May 2002.
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211
Phone: (202) 318-0520
Fax: (202) 318-0520
Web page: http://www.cramton.umd.edu
Bargaining; Signaling; U.S. Wage Negotiations;
Other versions of this item:
- Cramton, Peter C & Tracy, Joseph S, 1992. "Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 100-121, March.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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