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Decentralized Information and the Walrasian Outcome:A Pairwise Meetings Market with Private Values

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Paper provided by Brown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2000-13.

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Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2000-13

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Postal: Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912

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  1. Serrano, Roberto & Yosha, Oved, 1996. "Welfare Analysis of a Market with Pairwise Meetings and Asymmetric Information," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 167-75, June.
  2. Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2000. "Bargaining, coalitions and competition," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 279-296, 03.
  3. Serrano, Roberto & Yosha, Oved, 1993. "Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings: The One Sided Information Case," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 481-99, July.
  4. Max Blouin & Roberto Serrano, 1998. "A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics 98-5, Brown University, Department of Economics, revised 10 Aug 1998.
  5. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Gale, Douglas, 1987. "Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 20-54, October.
  7. Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Disagreement in Markets with Matching and Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 177-85, January.
  8. Wolinsky, Asher, 1987. "Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics 284, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  9. Moreno, Diego & Wooders, John, 2002. "Prices, Delay, and the Dynamics of Trade," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 304-339, June.
  10. McLennan, Andrew & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1991. "Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(5), pages 1395-1424, September.
  11. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1984. "On a theorem of Schmeidler," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 201-206, December.
  12. Gale, Douglas M, 1986. "Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 785-806, July.
  13. Rustichini, Aldo & Satterthwaite, Mark A & Williams, Steven R, 1994. "Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 1041-63, September.
  14. Gale, Douglas M, 1986. "Bargaining and Competition Part II: Existence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 807-18, July.
  15. Thomas A. Gresik & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1985. "The Rate at Which a Simple Market Becomes Efficient as the Number of Traders Increases: An Asymptotic Result for Optimal Trading Mechanisms," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 641, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  16. Hurwicz, Leonid, 1973. "The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 1-30, May.
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